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In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In
the rst type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public
goods that will benet some or all of them. In the second type, eco-
nomic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need to both
form a network and to decide how to share the output generated. For
both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid
for the right to decide upon the organization of economic activity. The
subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate ecient outcomes.
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11 Introduction
A substantial amount of economic activity takes place in settings that are
very dierent from the perfect competition model. A natural concern for
such environments is the attainment of ecient outcomes despite the dif-
culties stemming from strategic behavior and the market power partici-
pating agents have. In this paper we consider two such environments and
resolve the problem of achieving eciency by constructing appropriate bid-
ding mechanisms whose equilibria generate ecient outcomes. The mecha-
nisms proposed for these environments are based on the proposal developed
in P erez-Castrillo and Wettstein [19].
The rst environment is a local public goods economy where agents
produce the goods and share the production costs. Standard competitive
behavior typically leads to inecient outcomes. We suggest a simple se-
quential mechanism to decide upon the amounts produced and consumed
and show that its equilibria yield ecient outcomes.
In the second environment the main economic activity consists of the
formation of links among agents.1 The total output produced is a function
of the nal network formed. The network formed is ecient if the amount
of output it produced exceeds or equals the amount of output produced by
any other network. We again suggest a simple sequential mechanism with
the property that its equilibrium outcomes generate an ecient network.
The mechanisms suggested have as their rst stage a bidding game. The
winner of that bidding obtains the right to organize the economic activity;
however he is not a dictator. He proposes an organization of the activity
(either the amount of public goods for a coalition, or the network structure)
and a vector of transfers. If the agents accept his proposal, it is carried
out. In case the oer is refused the winner is removed from the game and
is left on his own. The remaining agents play the same game again starting
from the bidding stage. The subgame perfect equilibria of both mechanisms
generate ecient outcomes for their respective environments. The payos
received by the agents coincide with their Shapley values in appropriately
dened cooperative games.
Several previous papers were concerned with achieving eciency in en-
vironments similar to ours. Bagnoli and Lipman [3], Jackson and Moulin
[10], Bag and Winter [2], and Mutuswami and Winter [15] for the public
good environment and Jackson and Wolinsky [11], Dutta and Mutuswami
[9], Currarini and Morelli [7] and Mutuswami and Winter [15] for the net-
work formation framework. Sequential mechanisms that were constructed
by Moore and Repullo [13] and Maniquet [12] to realize general social choice
functions would work for our environments as well. Due to their large scope
1This type of structure has been used in dierent contexts, as the analysis of the
internal organization of rms or cost allocation schemes. See, for instance, the doctoral
dissertation of van den Nouweland [18].
2of coverage they are however more complex than the other mechanisms men-
tioned. We compare our proposal with the previous mechanisms and discuss
its advantages in the corresponding sections.
2 A local public goods economy
We consider environments with a set N = f1;:::;ng of agents that consume
m local public goods and one private good. The preferences of the agents
are quasi-linear in the private good. Agent i's preferences are given by
Ui(y;S;xi) = ui(y;S) xi, where S  N denotes the coalition to which the
agent belongs, y 2 <m
+ the level of public goods produced by the members
of S, and xi 2 < agent i's contribution towards the production of the public
goods. The local nature of the public good implies that an agent only enjoys
the public good produced by a coalition if he belongs to it. That is, each
coalition can bar agents not belonging to the coalition from consuming the
public goods produced by it. Also, the utility of an agent depends on both
the level of public goods and the identity of the partners in the coalition.
The technology is given by a cost function c(y;S), that describes the
cost (in terms of the private good) of producing y by the members of S.
Hence it could be that dierent coalitions have dierent costs for producing
identical amounts of public goods. Dierences may stem from size or from
the availability of dierent technologies.
An ecient partition and production plan for this economy is a feasible
allocation that maximizes the total payo members in N could obtain, by
possibly splitting into coalitions that would produce public goods for their













Aj is a partition of N and yj 2 <m




We can model the previous environment as a cooperative game with






ui(y;T)   c(y;T)jy 2 <m
+
)
The function w(T) thus measures the maximum total surplus that the
members of the coalition T can obtain by producing on their own some
vector of public goods. The resulting cooperative game (N;w) need not be
super-additive. We construct the super-additive cover of this cooperative











3Note that W(T) is the maximal total payo that members of T can
generate, possibly splitting into several subcoalitions. The Shapley value of
every agent in the cooperative game with the characteristic function W(S)




jSj!(n   jSj   1)!
n!
[W(S [ fig)   W(S)]
The Shapley value allocation, hence, generates an ecient partition and
produces the corresponding ecient levels of public goods. Moreover, it
shares the production costs in an equitable manner.
For the local public goods economy, we suggest a mechanism whose equi-
librium outcome would generate an ecient partition and production plan
for N. We view this as an implementation problem in an environment with
complete information. The mechanism constructed will in eect implement
the Shapley value (N;W).
The bidding mechanism proceeds as follows: In stage 1 the agents bid for
the right of being the proposer. Each agent bids by submitting an (n   1)-
tuple of payments to be made to all other players conditional of his being
chosen as the proposer. At the end of stage 1, based on the bids, one of the
agents is chosen as the proposer. Before moving to stage 2, the proposer pays
out the bids he made. In stage 2 the proposer oers a vector of payments
(typically negative) to all other players, chooses a coalition he wants to form,
and proposes a vector of public goods that will be produced and enjoyed by
the members of that coalition. The oer is accepted if all the other players
agree. In case of acceptance the coalition is formed, the proposer produces
the public goods and the players outside the coalition proceed to play the
same game again among themselves. In the case of rejection all the players
other than the proposer play the same game again.
Formally, if there is only one player fig, he chooses a vector y of public
goods. (If only one player plays, there is no bidding stage.)
Given the rules of the mechanism for at most n 1 players, the mechanism
for N = f1;:::;ng proceeds as follows:
t = 1: Each player i 2 N makes bids bi
j 2 < for every j 6= i. Hence, at
this stage, a strategy for player i is a vector (bi
j)j6=i 2 <n 1.








Let  = argmaxi(Bi) where an arbitrary tie-breaking rule is used in the case
of a non-unique maximizer. Once he has been chosen, player  pays b
i to
every player i 6= .
t = 2: Player  chooses a coalition S with  2 S, a production plan
y 2 <m
+ and makes an oer x
i 2 < to every player i 6= .2
2For the players in S,  x

i is the payment made by player i to the player  who bears
the whole cost of producing the public goods vector. For players outside S, x

i is the
payment necessary (positive or negative) to induce them to stay outside of S.
4t = 3: The players other than , sequentially, either accept or reject the
oer. If a player rejects it, then the oer is rejected. Otherwise, the oer is
accepted.
If the oer is accepted, each player i 6=  receives y
i , player  forms the
coalition S and produces y bearing the cost c(y;S). After this, players
in NnS proceed to play the game again among themselves. Therefore, the
nal payo to a player i 2 Snfg is ui(y;S)+x
i +b
i , player  receives






i , and the nal payment for a
player i 2 NnS will be the sum of the bid b
i , the oer x
i , and the payo
he will obtain in the game played by NnS. On the other hand, if the oer
is rejected, all players other than  proceed to play the same game where
the set of players is Nnfg and player  is on his own. The nal payo to
 is what he can obtain by himself (that is, maxy2<m
+[u(y;)   c(y;)])
minus the bids already paid. The nal payo to any player i 6=  is the sum
of the bid b
i and the payo he obtains in the game played by Nnfg.
Theorem 1 The subgame perfect equilibria of the bidding mechanism result
in an ecient partition and production plan for the local public goods econ-
omy. Moreover, the mechanism implements the Shapley value of (N;W).
Proof: We have described the underlying environment as a cooperative
game and considered its super-additive cover. This description allows us to
stablish a relationship between the implementation of (N;W) in the local
public goods set up and the implementation of the Shapley value of the
super-additive cover of a transferable utility game provided in Section 5
of P erez-Castrillo and Wettstein [19] (PC&W hereafter). Therefore, we
propose here a proof that is similar to that of Theorem 3 in PC&W.
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of players n. It is easy
to see that the theorem holds for k = 1. We assume that it holds for all
k  n 1 and then consider the following strategies for the case of n players:
At t = 1, each player i, i 2 N, announces bi
j = j(N;W) j(Nnfig;W)
for every j 6= i.
At t = 2, player i, if he is the proposer, chooses a coalition Si such
that Si 2 argmaxSN;S3i fw(S) + W(NnS)g, a production plan yi ecient
for Si, and oers xi
j = j(Nnfig;W)   uj(yi;Si) to every j 2 Sinfig and
xi
j = j(Nnfig;W)   j(NnSi;W) to every j 62 Si.
At t = 3, player i, if player j 6= i is the proposer and i 2 Sj, accepts
any oer greater than or equal to i(Nnfjg;W)   ui(yj;Sj) and rejects it
otherwise. If player j 6= i is the proposer and i 62 Sj, player i accepts any
oer greater than or equal to i(Nnfjg;W)   i(NnSj;W) and rejects it
otherwise.
The induction argument ensures that player i 62 S will obtain i(NnS;W)
if the game is played among the players in NnS. Also, player i 2 S obtains
5the utility derived from enjoying the public good, ui(y;S) plus the pay-
ment x
i . Then, it is easy to check that the total utility (taking into account
the bid) obtained by any player dierent from the proposer is i(N;W) when
all the players follow the previous strategies. Also, these strategies lead to
an ecient partition and to an optimal production plan of public goods for
each coalition. Hence, the proposer also obtains his Shapley value.
We now prove that the previous strategies constitute an SPE. The in-
duction argument makes it clear that the strategy at t = 3 is a best response
for any player dierent from the proposer. At t = 2, given the strategies
that the other players will follow at t = 3, player i's best decision (if he is
the proposer) is to choose a subset Si (such that i 2 Si), a production plan
yi 2 <m
+ and payments xi
j to every j 6= i.3 The coalition and production
plan are chosen so as to maximize





















uj(yi;Si)   c(yi;Si) +
+ W(NnSi)   W(Nnfig)
i
(1)




j(Nnfig;W)   uj(yi;Si) if j 2 Sinfig,
j(Nnfig;W)   j(NnSi;W) if j 62 Si.
The coalition Si and the level of public good yi that maximize (1) are the
ones proposed in the candidate strategy.
Finally, consider the strategies at t = 1. Notice that the balanced
contributions property (that is, i(N;W)   i(Nnfjg;W) = j(N;W)  
j(Nnfig;W) for all i;j 2 N. On this, see Myerson [17]) implies that Bi = 0




will be chosen as the proposer with certainty, but his payo will decrease
(it will be lower than i(N;W)). If he decreases Bi, another player will be
chosen as the proposer, and player i's payo would still equal his Shapley
value. Finally, any change in his bids that leaves Bi constant will in
uence
the identity of the proposer but will not alter player i's payo.
3Notice that the proposer always has the possibility of proposing an allocation that will
not be accepted by the other players. This possibility is equivalent to proposing Si = fig
and then x
i
j = j(Nnfig;W)   j(Nnfig;W) = 0 to every j 6= i and so it is implicitly
taken into account in what follows. Notice also that the bids made by the proposer are a
sunk cost at this stage and so do not enter the analysis at this point.
6To show that any SPE yields the Shapley value, denote the \eective






i + ui(y;S) if i 2 Snfg ;
x
i + i(NnS;W) if i 62 S.
By the induction argument, the eective oer is the total utility (without
taking into account the bid already received) that a player will obtain (at
equilibrium) if the oer is accepted. We proceed by a series of claims. We
state the claims without proof, since they are similar to those in Theorems
1 and 3 of PC&W.
Claim (a). In any SPE, any player j 6=  accepts the oer at t = 3 if
z
i > i(NnS;W) for every i 6= . If z
i < i(NnS;W) for some i 6= ,
then the oer is rejected.
Claim (b). In any SPE of the game that starts at t = 2,  will choose
a coalition S that is part of an ecient partition. Player  will announce
oers such that z
i = i(Nn;W) for all i 6= . Finally, at t = 3, every player
i 6=  accepts any oer such that z
i  i(Nn;W).4 The nal payos to






Claim (c). In any SPE, Bi = 0 for all i 2 N.
Claim (d). In any SPE, each player's payo is the same regardless of
who is chosen as the proposer.
Claim (e). In any SPE, the nal payment received by player i is i(N;W).
These claims complete the proof of the theorem. 
Bagnoli and Lipman [3], Jackson and Moulin [10], Bag and Winter [2],
and Mutuswami and Winter [15] also proposed mechanisms that realize ef-
cient outcomes in environments with (local) public goods. We now discuss
the advantages and distinguishing features of the bidding mechanism.
The rst distinguishing feature of our mechanism is that it does not
need a planner. The players do not submit messages to a planner who then
implements the nal outcome. In the bidding mechanism, the messages and
oers from a player are made directly to the other players. The agents can
play the mechanism by themselves. The only role that a third party might
play is to act as a court in case some player does not fulll his commitments.
This is an easy task here because the actions by the players are just contracts
(oers) which are easy to verify.
A second advantage of the proposed mechanism is that in contrast to
the mechanisms suggested in the previous contributions, it can handle en-
vironments with local public goods. It allows the participating agents the
4To be rigorous, if fg is part of any ecient partition, then there exist other equilibria
in addition to the previous ones. Any strategy prole such that at t = 2,  makes oers
such that z

j  j(Nn;W) to a particular player j 6=  and at t = 3, player j rejects any
eective oer less than or equal to j(Nn;W) also constitutes an SPE.
7possibility of splitting up into smaller coalitions. The outcome generated by
the mechanism species not only the production/consumption plan the in-
dividuals will follow but also the coalition structure that will prevail. Since
the outcome is ecient, coalitions other than the grand coalition can form
in equilibrium.
Third, the equilibria of bidding mechanism give rise to ecient outcomes
even when the utility of a player depends on the identity of the partners he
is with5 and the costs of production the public good dierent for dierent
coalitions. The bidding mechanism thus obtains eciency in a larger class
of environments than previous contributions.
The fourth feature is that equilibrium payos received by the agents in
our mechanism coincide with the Shapley value of the super-additive cover
of the corresponding cooperative game. It is important to point out that, in
this value, the total contributions made by the agents belonging to a coalition
do not necessarily match with the cost of the public good produced by this
coalition. In our mechanism therefore, there can be cross subsidies across
coalitions. Due to the possibility of cross subsidies, the value of a player is
a measure of his strategic possibilities not only inside the coalition to which
he ends up belonging, but also with agents outside this coalition.
In the two-stage mechanisms proposed by Bag and Winter [2] and Mu-
tuswami and Winter [15], the equilibrium payos coincide with the Shapley
values of the original cooperative game (not its super-additive cover) for
some environments.6 We think that in environments where forming the
grand coalition is not ecient, it is the super-additive cover which is the
relevant measure of social surplus and consequently, in looking for ecient
and equitable outcomes, it is the Shapley value of the super-additive cover
which is relevant. Moreover, in these papers, the Shapley value can be ob-
tained as actual payos only by assuming that each agent prefers the game
ending in Stage 1 (which gives the Shapley value as actual payos) to ending
in Stage 2 (which gives the value as expected payos). No such assumption
is required here: we always obtain the Shapley value as the actual payos.
Finally, it is worthwhile to remark that the equilibrium strategies in
the bidding mechanism are basically unique, eliminating the problem of
coordination that exists when strategies are not unique.
5See the papers by Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez [5] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson
[6] for an analysis of \pure hedonic coalitions." In these papers, the players have (ordinal)
preferences over the coalitions in which they are members, and the objective is to nd
conditions on preferences under which there exist a \stable partition" of players.
6Of course, the two solution concepts coincide if the game is super-additive. We observe
that in the environment analyzed by Bag and Winter [2], the corresponding cooperative
game is convex which is, of course, stronger than super-additivity.
83 Forming networks
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of agents. For any S  N, let gS denote the
set of all subsets of S of size 2. A graph or network, denoted generically
by g is some subset of gN. If g  gS where S ( N, then we shall say that
g is a graph restricted to S. A graph, therefore, is a structure of bilateral
relations among agents. Clearly, agents i and j have a bilateral relation
only if fi;jg 2 g. We shall refer to the subset fi;jg of g as the link between
i and j and denote it as (ij).7 We let GS denote the set of all graphs
involving links only between members of S: g 2 GS and (ij) 2 g implies
that fi;jg  S.
We need the following graph-theoretic terminology for what follows. Fix
a graph g. Players i and j are said to be connected in g if there exists
a sequence of agents i = i0;i1;:::;iK = j such that (ikik+1) 2 g for all
k = 0;:::;K   1. Let N(g)  fij There exists j such that (ij) 2 gg denote
the set of agents who have at least one bilateral relation. The graph h  g
is said to be a connected component of g if all agents in N(h) are connected
to each other in h, and for all i 2 N(h);j 2 NnN(h);(ij) 62 g. The set of
all connected components of g is denoted C(g).
A value function is a mapping v : GN ! <. We can think of the
value of a graph g as representing the total surplus produced by agents
when they form a set of bilateral relationships represented by g. We will
restrict attention to value functions satisfying component additivity, that is,
v(g) =
P
h2C(g) v(h). Component additivity can be interpreted as absence
of externalities between dierent components. We let V denote the set of
component additive value functions. Given v 2 V , a graph g is strongly
ecient if v(g)  v(g0) for all g0 2 GN. An allocation rule is a mapping
Y : V  G ! <n satisfying
P
i2N Yi(v;g) = v(g). An allocation rule simply
species the division of total surplus for each possible graph. An allocation
rule Y is component balanced if
P
i2N(h) Yi(v;g) = v(h) for every h 2 C(g).
An example of an allocation rule is the one proposed by Jackson and
Wolinsky [11] which associates to each graph, the Shapley value of a trans-
ferable utility game associated with the graph. Formally, x v. For any
graph g and S  N, let gjS  f(ij)j(ij) 2 g and fi;jg  Sg denote
the restriction of g to S. Dene the transferable utility game (N;wg) by
wg(S) =
P
h2C(gjS) v(h) for all S  N. The Jackson-Wolinsky allocation
rule for any graph g is the Shapley value of (N;wg).8 Jackson and Wolinsky
[11], extending an earlier result of Myerson [16], show that this is the unique
allocation rule satisfying component balance and equal bargaining power.9
7Our emphasis on bilateral relationships means that the links in our framework are
non-directed. We say more on the applicability of this mechanism to situations involving
directed links later.
8This value is also referred to in the literature as the Myerson value.
9The allocation rule Y satises equal bargaining power if Yi(v;g)   Yi(v;g   (ij)) =
9They also note that this allocation rule may arise naturally if the alloca-
tions result from bargaining between players. However, this bargaining is
not modeled explicitly.
In the game (N;wg), the worth of coalition S is the surplus generated
by looking at the restriction of g to S: in other words, the graph gjS. This
procedure, however, does not take into account the fact that the agents in
S can form many other graphs besides gjS and ideally one would like to
take this into consideration.10 However, the way to do this is not clear
for an arbitrary graph g. Suppose however that we restrict attention to
graphs which are strongly ecient. In this case, a natural possibility is to
associate to each coalition S the maximum surplus that can be derived by the
members of S acting on their own. One can now consider the transferable
utility game (N;W) dened by W(S) = maxfv(g)jg 2 GSg for all S  N
and the corresponding Shapley value. The game (N;W) can be easily seen
to be super-additive.
It is easy to see that the restricted graph gjS is not necessarily the graph
that maximizes the surplus for S even if g itself is strongly ecient. The
two approaches outlined above are thus bound to give dierent results. The
following example illustrates this possibility.
Example 1 Consider the following value function taken from Jackson and
Wolinsky [11]. Let N = f1;2;3g, and the component-additive value function
given by v((ij)) = v(gN) = 1 and, for i 6= j;i 6= k;j 6= k, v((ij);(jk)) = 1+
where 0 <  < 1=6. The strongly ecient networks are of the form gj =
f(ij);(jk)g. The Jackson-Wolinsky procedure applied to any gj gives the
allocation (xi;xj;xk) = ((1 + 2)=6;(2 + )=3;(1 + 2)=6) while the Shapley
value of (N;W) gives the uniform payo vector ((1+)=3;(1+)=3;(1+)=3).
This example also illustrates that, in contrast to the Jackson-Wolinsky rule,
the allocation rule proposed here need not be component balanced. We view
this as a consequence of having to take into account the strategic possibilities
open to an agent outside the component to which he belongs.
The bidding mechanism that we propose for the network environment
can be considered as a model of network formation in which a bargaining
process is modeled explicitly. In this mechanism, connected components are
formed sequentially. Formally, the bidding mechanism for network formation
operates as follows:
Yj(v;g)   Yj(v;g   (ij)) where g   (ij) is the graph obtained by removing the link (ij)
from g.
10Typically, the literature on social and economic networks assumes that agents have
the right to decide which links they want to form. See for instance, the papers of Jackson
and Wolinsky [11], Currarini and Morelli [7] or Dutta and Mutuswami [9]. In this context,
it is thus necessary that the complete strategic possibilities open to an agent be considered.
10If there is only one player i (say), he can only form the empty graph,
g = ; and therefore, he obtains v(;) = 0.11
Given the rules for at most n   1 agents, the mechanism for N =
f1;:::;ng works as follows:
t = 1: Same as in the mechanism constructed in Section 2.
t = 2: Player  chooses a subset of players S (such that  2 S), a
graph g
 2 GS (such that g
 is connected on S) and oers x
i 2 < to
every i 6= .
t = 3: The players other than , sequentially, either accept or reject the
oer. If an agent rejects it, then the oer is rejected. Otherwise, the oer is
accepted.
If the oer is accepted, then the nal payo to player i 2 Snfg is
x
i + b







i and players in NnS
receive x
i + b
i plus what they obtain in the game played by NnS. If the
oer is rejected, the nal payo to  is  
P
i6= b
i and nal payo to any
i 6=  is the sum of b
i and the payo obtained in the game played by Nnfg.
Theorem 2 At any subgame perfect equilibrium of the bidding mechanism,
a strongly ecient graph is always proposed and formed. Moreover, the
payos to the agents are uniquely given by the Shapley value of the game
(N;W).
Proof:. The proof is essentially identical to that of Theorem 1, and is thus,
omitted here. 
Remark 1 In principle, one can apply the bidding mechanism to situa-
tions involving directed links. However, we need an additional assumption:
namely, that establishing links needs the permission of both concerned par-
ties. This assumption may be valid in some circumstances. For instance, a
telephonic connection (directed link) may be initiated by one party, but it
requires the cooperation of both to carry forth a conversation. A similar con-
sideration, we think, is valid with e-mail. Equally, there may be situations
where links can be established unilaterally { in such cases, our mechanism
is not valid because a player whose proposal is rejected may reenter by uni-
laterally establishing links. Bala and Goyal [4] and Dutta and Jackson [8]
both consider network models involving directed links.
A recent literature on social and economic networks, stemming from the
paper of Jackson and Wolinsky [11] has also focused on the problem of gen-
erating ecient networks. It tries to resolve the tension between eciency
11Component additivity implies that the value of an isolated player (and therefore, the
empty graph) is zero.
11and stability of networks.12 Jackson and Wolinsky [11] showed that if the
allocation rule is required to satisfy both anonymity and component bal-
ancedness, then it is not possible to reconcile this tension. In a subsequent
paper, Dutta and Mutuswami [9] showed that this tension can be resolved
by using a mechanism design approach. Their formulation assumes the pres-
ence of a social planner who can decide the allocation rule to be followed
but cannot compel the agents to form the links that she desires. Dutta and
Mutuswami [9] showed that it is possible to construct an allocation rule
which, if proposed by the planner, will ensure that agents (acting in their
own self-interest) form an ecient network.13
In another paper, Currarini and Morelli [7] examine this problem when
there is no social planner. They analyze two sequential-move games.14 In
both games, an agent's strategy consists of two components. The rst com-
ponent speciying the set of agents with whom the agent wants to form links
is common to both games. The second component is a payo demand and
can be either a single absolute payo demand or a vector of demands, one
for each proposed link. Thus, the payo division in Currarini and Morelli [7]
is endogenous, in contrast to the analysis is Jackson and Wolinsky [11] and
Dutta and Mutuswami [9]. They show that all subgame perfect equilibria
of their games give rise to ecient networks. However, the payo division
is highly asymmetric being sensitive to the order in which agents move.
Our proposal is in the same line of research as Currarini and Morelli
[7]. The advantages of our mechanism with respect to theirs are, rst, that
the payo division are equitable corresponding to the Shapley value of a
game which takes into account the various network options available to the
agents. Second, our result holds for all component additive value functions
while their result holds only for anonymous value functions satisfying size
monotonicity. Finally, our mechanism is simpler in that it does not require
out-of-equilibrium free disposal.
12Stability of a network can be understood as meaning that there does not exist a
deviation for some group of agents which makes all deviating members better o. Jackson
and Wolinsky [11] restrict deviations to coalitions of size 2 while Dutta and Mutuswami
[9] allow for deviations by all coalitions. The reader is referred to their papers for details.
13Mutuswami and Winter [14] analyze a model of network formation in an explicitly
mechanism design setting. They present mechanisms which implement outcomes identical
to those of the bidding mechanism. However, their setting is dierent from ours. Our set-
ting is identical to that of Jackson and Wolinsky [11] and used among others by Currarini
and Morelli [7] and Dutta and Mutuswami [9]. This setting, in contrast to that of Mu-
tuswami and Winter [14] is not one of mechanism design because there is no informational
asymmetry between the agents and the planner.
14Aumann and Myerson [1] also analyze a network formation model with sequential
moves. The main dierence between their model and that of Currarini and Morelli [7] is
that in their work, the payo division is exogenous, being given by the Myerson value.
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